qatarperegrine (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
qatarperegrine) wrote2007-03-04 05:51 pm
qatarperegrine) wrote2007-03-04 05:51 pm
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Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord
Last week, the issue of hell came up at an interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Christians at Education City. One of the participants explained hell by saying that God loves people so much that God punishes us when we hurt another one of God's beloved servants. And, in fact, God loves us so much, God even punishes us for hurting ourselves. As happens every time the subject of hell and divine retribution comes up, I was struck by how little sense this concept makes to me.
I've never formally studied theories of justice, but when I worked in corrections, it seemed like there are a couple of different justifications given for punishing wrongdoers, for example:
But hell can't possibly serve any of the functions we accept as possible justification for punishment. It can't incapacitate or even deter people from committing further sins, since, well, they're dead. It can't rehabilitate them (this may be debated if, like Muslims, you believe hell may be temporary). I suppose you could argue that hell provides a general deterrent, since people might abstain from sins for fear of going to hell. But if that's the real justification for hell, then God is effectively sacrificing some people's eternal happiness in order to make an example of them for others, and it's hard to imagine God being so... well, un-Kantian.
When you've ruled out the utilitarian justifications for punishment, it seems like the only one left (to my knowledge) is retribution. The retribution theory of justice says that it is moral to punish someone for wrongdoing even if the punishment won't improve the situation, simply because wrongdoing merits punishment. This doesn't make a lot of sense to me, for the reason discussed above in the kitten example. There may be circumstances in which it is ethical to harm someone, because that harm is necessary for a greater good. But if no greater good is served, then harming someone is wrong, even if they've previously harmed someone else. Two wrongs don't make a right.
So, readers, what do you think? Is there any utilitarian justification for the existence of hell? Is retribution an adequate justification? Or is there some other justification entirely? (Of course, if things are virtuous because they are godly and not vice versa, there is no reason to justify God's actions whatsoever -- but, then we also shouldn't advance arguments like the one that came up at the interfaith dialogue.)
I've never formally studied theories of justice, but when I worked in corrections, it seemed like there are a couple of different justifications given for punishing wrongdoers, for example:
- incapacitation: wrongdoers should be prevented from being able to commit further crimes against the community.
- specific deterrence: wrongdoers should be punished in order to discourage them from committing further crimes.
- general deterrence: wrongdoers should be punished in order to discourage other people from committing similar crimes.
- rehabilitation: wrongdoers should be helped to become more productive members of society in future.
But hell can't possibly serve any of the functions we accept as possible justification for punishment. It can't incapacitate or even deter people from committing further sins, since, well, they're dead. It can't rehabilitate them (this may be debated if, like Muslims, you believe hell may be temporary). I suppose you could argue that hell provides a general deterrent, since people might abstain from sins for fear of going to hell. But if that's the real justification for hell, then God is effectively sacrificing some people's eternal happiness in order to make an example of them for others, and it's hard to imagine God being so... well, un-Kantian.
When you've ruled out the utilitarian justifications for punishment, it seems like the only one left (to my knowledge) is retribution. The retribution theory of justice says that it is moral to punish someone for wrongdoing even if the punishment won't improve the situation, simply because wrongdoing merits punishment. This doesn't make a lot of sense to me, for the reason discussed above in the kitten example. There may be circumstances in which it is ethical to harm someone, because that harm is necessary for a greater good. But if no greater good is served, then harming someone is wrong, even if they've previously harmed someone else. Two wrongs don't make a right.
So, readers, what do you think? Is there any utilitarian justification for the existence of hell? Is retribution an adequate justification? Or is there some other justification entirely? (Of course, if things are virtuous because they are godly and not vice versa, there is no reason to justify God's actions whatsoever -- but, then we also shouldn't advance arguments like the one that came up at the interfaith dialogue.)
Re: This is Aristopheles on a defective browser
I am a defective browser
1. I do remember reading that "hell" in Islam is not forever, and all will finally reach the goal the Creator intends for them- bliss. But I don't get that impression when the word is used by Moslems. Am I mistakenly conflating the usual Christian denotation of "hell" with a Moslem one which is not identical?
Having said that, I do like the idea that, after death, we realise the evil we have done and feel shame, grief, pain or whatever because of it. It used to be called "purgatory" by Roman Catholics. Is that the "hell" of my previous point?
2. All (western) philosophy consists of footnotes to Plato. Not my quote, but I forget who said it. The Euthyphro is well worth mulling over.
3. The flip side of Aristopheles' comment is my biggest reason for "needing" heaven: there must be justice and joy somewhere for those who have neither while on this planet."Hell" for the perpetrators of evil does not help those who died in genocides, pogroms, or nasty urban confrontations, whether or not it helps the survivors deal with the horrible reality of their experiences. And I do recognise that the "must" I just used is in my head and not therefore necessarily in any reality outside human constructs. I think I choose to believe that it reflects reality. As C S Lewis once said, we would not have a thirst for water unless water existed. And, as Puddleglum said, he would hold on to his idea of the sun, and not cut his perceptions down to the pitiful light of the witch's lamp.
Sorry my language is opaque even to me this time. Apologies to any non native english speaker who tries to get through it!